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Abstract. A general equilibrium model is proposed which assumes that firms hire both
official and unregistered workers as imperfect substitutes, that entrepreneurs differ in their
ability to increase the efficiency of official labour, and that this ability is due to
heterogeneous original ability and to Marshallian (non-linear) externalities. In equilibrium,
smaller firms hire fewer official workers and are less efficient. If externalities increase
sufficiently when firms are numerous, two stable equilibria exist where the number and the
size of firms, the proportion of official employment, overall output and efficiency are,
respectively, small (the trap) and large. The increase of individual ability due to, e.g.,
educational policies, has positive effects on the equilibrium number of firms, overall
output, and labour regularisation. High and evenly distributed entrepreneurship also make it
more likely that increased externalities and penalties on the underground economy will
have positive effects. These results may contribute to the current debate on the underground
economy in the Southern areas of Italy
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40. Introduction
The “underground economy” is an awkward subject for both
economists and policy makers. Economists find it difficult to define and to
measure, while their main explanations of it are highly partial. Indeed, they
produce extremely diverse estimates of the underground economy in the same
country, depending on the definitions and the method used (Lippert and Walker
1997).1 By contrast, explanations of the phenomenon at the theoretical and
empirical levels are usually restricted to the heavy weight of the tax burden and
to excessive regulations (Schneider 1997; Feige 1989; Tanzi 1980). Policy
makers are discomfited by the fact that the underground economy is detrimental
to tax revenues and, more generally, to social order, whereas it is able to
generate employment and income.
A step towards better understanding and management of the problem of
the underground economy is to consider it in connection with the structure of
the economy, whether this is advanced or less developed. Estimates agree that
the underground economy is most widespread in the less developed countries,
and, within the Oecd, in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Schneider and Enste
2000, European Commission 1998; Schneider 1997). Nevertheless, the tax
burden is not only particularly heavy in Greece and in Italy, it is also heavy in
the Scandinavian countries, and even in Austria (Oecd 1997), which displays a
very low incidence of underground economic activity.2 But the most striking
evidence concerns the South of Italy compared to the rest of the country. In
                                                          
1
 Tanzi (1999), in surveying the literature, observes that these estimates, in percentages
of GDP, “range from 1.4% to 47.1% for Canada, and from 6.2% to 19.4 for the US […] In
Germany [they range] from 14.5 to 31.4”.
2
 Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton (1998) do find that more regulations are
associated with a larger share of underground economy, but after controlling for Gdp per capita.
5fact, the Southern Italian regions are characterised both by a less developed
economic structure and by a more widespread underground economy, although
they are subject to the same tax system and regulations - if not lighter ones - as
the Northern regions. These facts can be explained if we look at the different
forms assumed by underground activity. In the Mediterranean countries or
regions, the non-registration of labour is standard practice for both firms,
though to different extents, and private employees, who otherwise are faced by
unemployment with no social benefits available. The economic structure thus
mainly consists of small firms, which can compensate for technological
inefficiencies by low unregistered labour costs (Donolo and Capparucci 1999;
Commissione Lavoro della Camera dei Deputati 1998). By contrast, in the
Northern countries or regions of Europe and in the US unregistered work is
typically of secondary importance, and it is often pursued by those who are
already employed.3 Therefore, one may state the stylised fact that a widespread
underground economy is associated with inefficient techniques, few and small
units and low output; and conversely that a small proportion of underground
activity in the economy is linked with more efficient techniques, more and
larger units, and a greater output.
It might be thought that development, and hence the reduction of the
underground economy, is an automatic process. However, this does not seem
always to be the case. Analysis of convergence among per capita GDPs in the
European regions clearly shows that many poor regions tend to stagnate, or
even that they form a low income club of regions (Tondl 1999; Paci 1997).
Even more clearly, recent trends in many regions of Southern Italy, together
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 Another component of unregistered labour consists of immigrants, but its relative
importance may be great in the richest countries and regions as well as in the other areas
(European Commission 1998; Petersen 1998).
6with the persistent, if not increasing, diffusion of underground practices,
suggest the existence of an underdevelopment trap.
This paper is a first attempt to study the interaction between the
underground economy and the economic structure as characterised by the size
and the number of firms, as well as by overall productivity and output. It seeks
to describe the case of an economy trapped in an equilibrium comprising a high
proportion of underground activity, small sized and few firms, and overall low
productivity and output. Conversely, it is possible to represent an economy in a
better equilibrium where these characteristics are reversed.
The theoretical literature on the underground economy in a general
equilibrium setting is not substantial, and it concentrates mainly on the effects
of fiscal policy, paying little or no attention to the heterogeneous performance
of firms, or to other characterisations of the economic structure (Bental et al.
1985; Ginsburgh 1985; Bennett 1990; Agenor and Aizenman 1999; De Geijsel
1985). When the connection between sluggish development and a large
underground economy is studied, the erosion of the tax base in order to finance
growth-enhancing public services has been considered (Loayza 1996; Johnson,
Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998). However, South Italy has not been
subject to revenue constraint because it is subsidised by North Italy. In this
case,  instead called into question has been the excessive labour cost fixed in
the more productive part of the country (Brunetta and Ceci 1998). This paper,
however, concentrates on the role of entrepreneurship, rather than on the
provision of public services or on rigid wages.
The problem of determining an interior solution for the size of the
underground economy is usually solved by distinguishing between two goods,
7officially and unofficially produced, and thus two kinds of demand for them.4
Instead, in Rauch (1991) the economic structure is characterised by the
allocation of heterogeneous entrepreneurship between the sectors, one informal
and the other formal, and by the smaller-sized and less productive firms of the
former. This approach is able to provide an interior solution, although both
output and labour are homogeneous, but it fails to avoid the assumption of
specialised firms in the two sectors, which is often unrealistic.5
The model presented here follows the latter approach, but it is also able
to deal with mixed firms, i.e. those which employ both unregistered and official
labour. It assumes that the potential entrepreneur - depending on his/her ability
to train official labour better, and on the given possibility of evading the fiscal
burden on labour - chooses the best mix, thus also choosing the technique for
producing the same good. The second key feature of the model, intended to
capture an important aspect of industrialisation, is the assumption of
Marshallian externalities among firms. This assumption, combined with the
given distribution of entrepreneurial ability, makes two general stable equilibria
possible: one “good”, and one “bad”. This result suggests that development and
underground activity may be induced into a trap.
The policy implications to be drawn from the model are interesting, not
only as regards the possibility of passing from the “bad” to the “good”
equilibrium, but also to check the popular wisdom that policies  intended to
reduce the underground economy also reduce the number of firms and overall
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 Alternatively, De Gijsel (1985) adopts a Nash solution, as due to different preferences
of both the employers and workers between official and unregistered work. Bonatti (2000) fixes
the numbers of firms in the legal sector and in the informal sector.
5
 The allocation of entrepreneurial talent approach was introduced by Lucas (1978) and
then developed by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991). For a first application of it to study of
the underground economy see Pugno (2000).
8output. This is of particular interest as regards the North/South dualism in Italy,
and even more so as regards the different areas of South Italy.
The paper is organised as follows: section 1 sets out the assumptions of
the model, sections 2 and 3 develop the solution of the model, section 4 carries
out some exercises in comparative statics, and draws policy considerations,
section 5 concludes, while three appendices give the mathematical proofs.
1. The Assumptions of the Model
Let us assume that numerous firms competitively produce one good by
using homogeneous labour in two different ways, either by registering it and
paying the relative taxes and contributions, or by not registering it and thus
avoiding this fiscal burden.
The different treatment of labour by firms is taken a step further here,
i.e. in the techniques of production. In the case of official labour, in fact, rules
and norms, usually established by private contracts or collective bargaining, are
applied, but they are not applied in the case of unregistered labour. When
workers are officially employed, the relationship between them and firms is
more stable and more closely integrated, and this makes it possible, or easier, to
foster workforce learning activities – either unintentional, such as ‘learning by
doing’, or intentional, such as ‘training on the job’. In fact, learning activity can
be likened to specific investments that can take only place in the presence of
stable relationships. By contrast, unregistered labour does not usually imply a
stable and systematic relationship between workers and firms, so that a learning
process rarely occurs, or does not happen at all. The learning activity carried on
by legal workers implies that they can use more efficiently the technology
adopted by firm, thus exhibiting a higher productivity. Illegal workers, instead,
9do not reach the same level of productivity since they do not acquire, or do not
acquire in the same degree, the knowledge related to the level of technology
adopted by firm. The hypotheses that the learning activity is directly related to
the level of technology and that it is more probable when there are stable
relationships between workers and firms have been advanced by several
authors (Acemoglu 1997, Burdett and Smith 1996 and Stevens 1994)6. In this
paper we extend these hypotheses to the case of legal and illegal workers, since
one of major difference between these two kinds of workers is not only the
different cost sustained by firms for them, but also the different types of
working-relationship: stable and integrated in the case of legal workers,
marginal and unstable in the case of illegal workers. These differences may
have a direct effect on the learning by doing carried on by workers and, as a
consequence, on their productivity. In order to capture these facts, two different
techniques of production are assumed, depending on whether official or
unregistered labour is employed.
Formally, the microeconomic production function specifies two
different efficiencies for labour, as follows:
(1) [ ]αα β isilii llBy ,, += with 0and10 ≥<< βα
where y indicates output of the only good in this economy whose price is the
numeraire, ll and ls are respectively the official and the unregistered labour
employed. The subscript i refers to the i-th firm. Bi is the productivity of legal
workers, which is different from the productivity of illegal workers (β)7,  and it
represents firm’s  best technology, insofar as Bi>β (although this restriction is
not necessary to the model).
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 See for an application to a growth framework Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 6).
7
 Hence, ll and ls are not perfect substitutes, while neither of them is essential.
10
At this regard, a further crucial assumption of the model is that the
firm’s best technology depends on the entrepreneurial ability and on the
positive externalities arising from existing firms. Individual entrepreneurial
ability originates from the exogenous natural propensities of individuals which
can be thought of with a fixed distribution over population (cf. Baumol 1990).
While the externalities are assumed to be of Marshallian type, and are intended
to capture the typical effects of the industrial district. In fact, a crucial feature in
the development of an industrial district is that firms should be sufficiently
numerous within a given area to be able to display productive inter-
relatedness.8 Hence, externalities may not be linear in the number of firms;
rather, they may accelerate when the industrial district becomes established.
Formally, let us assume that Bi depends on entrepreneurial ability and
on economy wide externalities according to the following equation:
(2) )()(),( ETEAEEBB iii ==
where )( iEA  is the original individual ability, assumed to differ among
individuals, so that they can be ranked in descending order of ability according
to the following distribution function:
(3) 1−= ηη ii EA with 10 << η ∈iE
 
Ei indicates the i-th entrepreneur, who ranges from 0 to E, E is a measure of
active firms. Since entrepreneurs are ranked, and run one firm each, E is also
the group of the ablest entrepreneurs.9 Hence, Bi is decreasing in Ei for any
given E.
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 In Becattini’s (1979:47) words: “The Marshallian industrial district consists of […] a
localised thickening of interindustrial relationships” [our translation].
9
 This distribution is chosen because it belongs to the well-known Paretian type, but care
must be taken over the limiting case of E → 0. The conclusions of the paper are qualitatively the
same if the distribution is of Gaussian type.
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The function T, which captures the externality effects, is increasing in
E, so that the larger is E, the higher is the ability of all the active entrepreneurs,
which represents the best technology. In particular, T is assumed to be of the
logistic type, as follows:
zEv
e
ET
−+
=
1
1)(
It is therefore possible to specify the productivity of the legal workers in
the marginal firm, which is the least productive firm of the group E, and hence
it is the E-th firm:
(2’)
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−
−
+
===
1
)()()(
1ηη
.
This function has two decreasing traits at the extreme, where decreasing
individual ability prevails, and it can have an increasing trait in the middle,
where externality can prevail (see Fig.1). In fact, in the first trait the number of
firms is too small for sufficient externalities to arise; in the second trait the
number of firms may reach the critical mass required to form an industrial
district, and hence to raise the efficiency of all firms, thereby overcoming the
decreasing effect of individual ability; in the third trait externalities approach
exhaustion, and the shape of ability distribution prevails. Note that for any
given E, and hence for any point (E,B), there exists a function Bi, which is
decreasing in Ei(<E) until Ei=E, where Bi=B.
Finally we define the cost function which includes official labour, as
weighted by the fiscal burden, and the unregistered labour, which is also
burdened to some extent, because of the risk of being fined. A third cost
component is assumed: namely a fixed cost, which captures the effort to enter
the market. Thus:
(4)   cm) l ( w t) l ( w c s,i sl,ili ++++= 11
12
with 0<t<1 0<m<1 and m<t
where ci is the total cost for the firm, wl and ws are the wage rates of official
and unregistered labour respectively, t is the tax rate, inclusive of social
contributions, and m is the fiscal burden on unregistered labour, which is due to
a multiple of evaded taxes times the probability to be fined. Fixed cost is
denoted by c .
B(E)
EFig. 1
As concerns the labour market, let us assume that it is populated by a
fixed number of individuals: LL = . They have an identical utility function
linear in consumption and derive no disutility from supplying labour. Each
individual is endowed with a one-unit flow of labour, which is offered
inelastically. Therefore L is also equal to the aggregate flow of labour supply.
Finally, the labour market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
2. Microeconomic Equilibrium
Firms choose their amounts of official and of unregistered labour by
maximising total profits given by:
(5)
 iii cy −=pi
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where pii is the total profits, inclusive of the quasi-rent earned by the
entrepreneurs as far as they can exhibit ability. The two labour demands for
official and unregistered labour respectively, derived from first order
conditions, are:
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Hence, the ratio between ll * and sl * of the i-the firm is equal to:
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Eqs. (6) and (8) indicate that the greater the ability of the i-th entrepreneur, the
larger the size of his firm, and the greater the firm’s degree of regularisation. A
first analytical result is thus obtained: the link among size, efficiency and the
proportion of registered labour as characteristics of heterogeneous maximising
firms.
By substituting equations (6), (7) into eqs. (1) and (4), and then into the
profit function (5), we obtain the following equation:
(9) cEEycllETEA iSlii −−=−+−=∗ ),(*)1(*]*)()()[1( αβαpi αα .
The i-th entrepreneur will enter the market if he will find positive
(equilibrium) profits, i.e. if ( ) 0, * ≥EEipi . Since heterogeneous entrepreneurs
imply heterogeneous profits,  entrepreneurs will enter the market until the least
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able one  finds zero profit, i.e. ( ) 0* == EEipi . In this case, everyone  will have
made the best choice, and hence the equilibrium number of active firms  has
been determined.
As regards workers, these may choose to work as official or
unregistered labour according to which arrangement ensures higher indirect
utility. Further, we assume that workers are interested only in wages net of
fiscal burden. Thus, given the assumptions on the utility function, the workers’
decision rule about the type of job to take, legal or illegal, becomes:
(10) Sl ww ≥ .
3. General Equilibrium
This economy will be in equilibrium if three conditions hold: no further
firm enters or leaves the market; no further worker changes type of
employment; the labour market is in equilibrium. Given the assumption of free
entry, the first equilibrium condition implies that for the marginal entrepreneur,
who is least able, 0=∗pi , while the second condition implies that the wages of
official and unregistered workers in equilibrium will be equal. Finally the third
condition is the usual market clearing condition whereby aggregate labour
supply is equal to the aggregate labour demand.
By substituting the optimal values for ll and lS (equations (6) and (7)
respectively) into equation (1), and then into (9), and by taking into account
that in equilibrium www lS == , the zero-profit condition for the marginal firm
becomes:
15
(11) ( ) α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
βαβαα
−
−−
−
−











+
+


+


 −
=
1
11
1
1
1
11
)(1
mt
EB
c
wP
Equation (11) is drawn in Fig. 2:
wP
****
*
EFig. 2
This curve, which resembles the B(E) curve, shows different combinations of
wage and number of active firms, the marginal of which exhibits zero profit.
Hence, it does not reflect the technological conditions of the infra-marginal
firms. These firms benefit both from the externalities given by the number of
active firms like all the others, and from the individual higher ability of the
entrepreneur, thus earning positive profits.10 All firms take externalities as
given, while the curve in Fig.2 depicts the conditions where externalities are
endogenous. Note that if firms, for a given wage, conjecture the enjoyment of a
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 For a given E the curve identifies the wage level that reduces the profit of the E-th firm
to zero, while the other active firms (Ei), which are on the left of the E-th along the x-axis,
would require a higher wage level to reduce profits to zero. Hence, a decreasing zero-profit
curve for all active firms may be drawn for each E, which implies a certain degree of externality.
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certain degree of externality which is generally different from the endogenous
one, they adjust in the right direction.11
The labour market equilibrium condition is:
(12) Sl LLL +=
where L  is the aggregate labour supply equal to the population, and it will
normalised to 1, while ∫= E ill dilL
0
,
 and ∫= E iSS dilL
0
,
 are the aggregate demands
for official and unregistered labour respectively.
Substituting eqs. (6) and (7) into the integrals above, and then into eq.
(12), the labour market equilibrium condition becomes:
(13)
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Equation (13) shows different combinations of the wage and the number of
firms ensuring equilibrium in the labour market. Obviously, the relationship
between wage and number of firms is positive, since eq. (13) reflects the labour
supply constraint. In equilibrium it must be that LP ww = .
Therefore the system formed by equations (11) and (13) gives rise to
equation (14).
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 If, for example, a certain degree of externality is conjectured, and hence a zero-profit
curve for all firms can be drawn, a given wage would fix the conjectured number of active
entrepreneurs on this curve. If the least able of them realises positive (negative) profits, more
entrepreneurs enter (leave) the market, until the marginal firm is on the curve depicted in Fig.2.
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From this equation the following can be stated.
Proposition 1: There exists at least one equilibrium that yields the wage (w*)
for which the labour market clears and no firm enters or leaves the market,
thus determining E*. Moreover, there may also be multiple equilibria, one of
which is unstable and two are stable. The first stable-equilibrium is
characterised by a wage and a number of firms less than those of the second
stable-equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix 1.
Fig. 3 depicts the above results by approximating equation (13) as a
straight line.
w
EFig. 3
(a) (b)
(c)
The model thus yields at least one equilibrium, where a positive but not
exhaustive proportion of underground economy is determined, and where all
firms are involved in this mixed activity to different extents depending on their
size.
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In cases (a) and (c) there is a unique equilibrium. However the two
cases are quite different. In case (a) the intersection between the two curves
takes place in the first trait of the zero-profit curve, when the number of firms is
so low  that it does not give rise to substantial effects of  Marshallian
externalities. The size of firms  is relatively small, and the underground
proportion is relatively large. This equilibrium can represent an economy in the
first stages of its development. Case (c) shows a completely different situation,
although wages may be similar. In fact, the externalities have been largely
exploited, and the zero-profit curve is decreasing because of the natural scarcity
of individual ability.  This may be the case of a more mature economy where
firms are able to exploit their potential  for growth. Case (b) is an intermediate
situation. It shows the possibility that multiple equilibria may arise. In this case
economies that start from different numbers of firms may reach a completely
different equilibrium, even if they have equal parameters values. One
equilibrium is characterised by a larger amount of firms and is similar to case
(c), another has fewer firms and is similar to case (a).
The different cases can be also compared in terms of the aggregate
output generated. In this regard we can state:
Proposition 2: i) The condition α>
+
+
t
m
1
1
, is sufficient in order that a greater
equilibrium number of firms generates a larger amount of aggregate output ;
ii) in the case of multiple equilibria, for any values of parameters, equilibrium
with a larger number of firms is Pareto-superior and is characterised by both
average and marginal firm with a degree of regularisation (g) higher than that
exhibited by both average and marginal firm in the low equilibrium.
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Proof: see appendix 2.
Proposition 2 enables us to compare the different kinds of equilibrium
discussed above according to the level of aggregate output generated. It states
that if the ratio between the price of unregistered labour and the price of official
labour, which  because of the assumptions made is lower than 1, is larger than
the parameter which captures the productivity of labour factor (irrespectively
of whether it is legal or illegal), the equilibrium with a lower number of firms
gives rise to a lower amount of aggregate output. As  regards the case of
multiple equilibria, for any values of parameters the lower equilibrium
generates a level of aggregate output lower then that associated with a high
equilibrium; moreover, in the low equilibrium firms use unregistered labour
more intensively. The case of Pareto-ranked multiple equilibria is particularly
interesting, since it implies the possibility that the economy, at an initial stage
of its development, may be induced into an underdevelopment trap.
4. Comparative Statics and Policy Considerations
Simple exercises of comparative statics can help us to identify policies to
reduce unregistered labour, increase the efficiency of the economy, and,
possibly, to enable escape from the underdevelopment trap. Interesting
parameters of the model for policies are: m, which is the fiscal burden on the
unregistered labour; z, which is a measure of externalities; and η, which
20
captures the entrepreneurial ability that does not depend on the economic
environment.12
The fiscal burden may be increased by tighter fiscal controls and by
raising penalties. Externalities  may be increased by providing or incentivising
public services for legal activities. Individual entrepreneurial ability may be
increased by educational policies.
All these policy measures increase the degree of regularisation of the
firms (g-ratio), and then reduce the overall size of the underground economy, as
seen in the previous section. However, popular wisdom holds that reduction of
the underground economy also reduces the overall number of firms and the
level of overall economic activity. It is thus interesting to check whether the
model confirms this result.
Let us first observe that the restriction 
t
m
+
+
<
1
1
α  is not strict and can be
taken for granted. In fact, even in an extreme case where m = 0 and t = 0.5, it
becomes α<0.67, and the data on the labour share in income not generally give
a higher figure. Hence, a larger number of firms always produces a higher
amount of output. This is a reasonable result when studying the underground
economy, which is usually populated by small firms that cannot significantly
exploit scale returns.
The effectiveness of policies can be studied by considering the
following propositions.
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 The uncomfortable properties of the Paretian distribution around the asymptote
suggest us to ignore that part in which E is very small. In fact, a rise in η increases
individual ability if 0ln1)( 1
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Proposition 3: A higher level of parameter η  implies a greater equilibrium
number of firms (E*), and a higher level of overall output (Y*), in the case of
one equilibrium. In the case of two stable equilibria these expansionary effects
remain valid, in particular the lower equilibrium may disappear.
Proof: see Appendix 3.
This proposition suggests  that policies  intended to increase individual
entrepreneurial ability are always effective in both reducing the underground
economy and  expanding the number of firms and overall output. Moreover,
this kind of policy may push the economy on to the right track, if it is caught in
the underdevelopment trap.
Proposition 4: A higher level of parameter z implies greater equilibrium
numbers of firms, and higher levels of overall output (Y*) in both cases of one
and two stable equilibria, if )1(1
1
αα
αη
−
−
<
+
+
t
m
. While a higher level of  parameter
z has ambiguous effects on the equilibrium numbers of firms, and on the levels
of overall output (Y*) in both cases of one and two stable equilibria if
)1(1
1
αα
αη
−
−
>
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m
. However, if the equilibrium number of firms tends to 0, the
expansionary effects are anyhow safe.
Proof: see Appendix 3.
This proposition suggests that policies intended to increase positive
externalities of production  through the employment of official labour are
generally effective in both reducing the underground economy and expanding
overall output. Whereas an increase in η makes entrepreneurial ability more
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evenly distributed, and thus favours small firms, an increase in z favours the
middle-able entrepreneurs. Hence, in this case the demand for labour is
considerably increased, and this may raise wages and push small firms out of
the market. This particular case occurs when small firms are very widespread
because of very small η.
Proposition 5: A higher level of parameter m implies greater equilibrium
numbers of firms, and higher levels of overall output (Y*) in both cases of one
and two stable equilibria, if 
α
αη
−
−
<
+
+
11
1
t
m
. A higher level of parameter m
implies smaller equilibrium numbers of firms, and lower levels of overall
output (Y*) in both cases of one and two stable equilibria if 
α
αη
−
−
>
+
+
11
1
t
m
.
Proof: see Appendix 3.
This proposition suggests that policies intended to increase controls and
penalties, though effective in reducing the underground economy, has
ambiguous effects on the number of firms and on overall output. If controls and
penalties are initially small in amount relatively to entrepreneurial ability, their
increase is beneficial to overall output, but if they are initially of large amount,
their increase is detrimental. In the case of two (stable) equilibria, increasing
controls and penalties may be effective in escaping from the underdevelopment
trap, but too much controls and penalties in an underdeveloped area may have
perverse effects.
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Corollary: The relevant configurations of parameters can be of three types,
and for each type a different mix of effects due to changes in z and m emerges
as follows:
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Whereas 
η∂
∂ *E
 is generally positive.
Proof: It follows from Propositions 3, 4 and 5.
This schema suggests that individual entrepreneurial ability is a key
factor, because if a policy is able to increase it, the effects are always positive,
and if it  is lacking, it may hinder the other policies.
5. Conclusions
The theoretical literature on the underground economy is meagre, and it
concentrates mainly on the microeconomic aspects of tax evasion. The
phenomenon of the underground economy is instead recognised as important
by empirical studies, which also reveal that it is not evenly distributed, but is
more widespread in less developed areas. This fact has prompted the present
paper, which attempts to explain the different coexistence of the underground
economy with the official economy in a more developed area with respect to a
less developed one.
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Unfortunately, underground economic behaviour is very heterogeneous,
and difficult to observe, so that it cannot be easily stylised. Nevertheless, a few
plausible hypotheses can be put forward regarding some important features of
this phenomenon. Firstly, firms hire unregistered labour only partly, side by
side with official employees. Secondly, firms use the two different kinds of
labour more as complements to each other than as substitutes. This is because
official labour implies a more stable relationship with the entrepreneur, so that
greater efficiency may ensue. Thirdly, entrepreneurship is important in
explanation of the abandonment by a firm of small-sized and low-productive
processes largely based on unregistered labour. Fourthly, entrepreneurship
depends, in a given area, on individual ability, which may be very
heterogeneous, and across different areas, on the density of enterprises, which
is likely to give rise to positive externalities. In particular, the literature on
industrial districts emphasises the importance of a critical density which
generates an acceleration in economic development.
On the basis of these hypotheses the model proposed is able to
substantiate the following results:13
- an equilibrium both micro- and macro-economic exists when firms find it
convenient to employ both unregistered and official labour;
- the degree of regularisation by each firm depends on entrepreneurship and
on the relative fiscal burden; in particular, the better the entrepreneur’s
ability, the greater the demand for official labour, thus implying a more
efficient and large firm;
                                                          
13
 A refinement of the model could give better specification to the behaviour of the
workers, who are here assumed to be homogeneous, and with a very simplistic (and
implicit) utility function.
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- in the macro-economic equilibrium the number of firms, their size, the
overall productivity and output are determined as well;
- if a critical density of enterprises exists, two stable equilibria can be
determined: a “good” equilibrium where the economy is populated by many
firms, with high productivity and output and low degree of labour
regularisation; and a “bad” equilibrium with the reverse features, which can
thus be termed  an underdevelopment trap;
- the possibility of escaping from the underdevelopment trap, or at any rate of
increasing the level of regularisation and overall efficiency, derives from
policy measures designed to improve entrepreneurship, especially when the
improvement is evenly distributed;
- by contrast, tighter fiscal controls have overall perverse effects if
entrepreneurship is particularly scarce.
These results are of particularly relevance to the debate on the
underground economy in the Southern areas of Italy. In fact, these results
suggest that an economy may fall into an undervelopment trap when
underground activities are particularly convenient, although not exhaustive but
rather complementary. The best policies suggested are those  intended to
improve entrepreneurship, especially through educational policies. The policies
directly targeted on combatting the underground economy, like tighter controls
and penalties, appear to be effective only when entrepreneurship is sufficiently
developed and evenly distributed across firms.
Therefore, in order to reduce the underground economy, the most effective
policy is to make registered labour more convenient, rather than to make
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unregistered labour less convenient. The best strategy appears to be that of
combatting underdevelopment, rather than underground activities as such.14
Appendix 1
The expression on the LHS of the equation (14) is decreasing for
+∞→E , and it tends to +∞ for 0→E ; while the expression on the RHS is
always increasing and is equal to 0 for E=0. This implies that the two curves
intersect each other at least once.
Moreover, given that the zero-profit curve (eq.(10)) may change its
course twice, as in Fig. 4, the curves may intersect with each other three times:
twice in the descending traits of the zero-profit curve, and once in the
increasing trait.
                                                          
14
 A very recent paper on the effects of the underground economy on unemployment
reaches an analogous conclusion. By adopting a very different model Boeri and Garibaldi
(2000) conclude that the best policy for reducing unemployment is to raise overall
productivity or to combat it directly, rather than to increase penalties on the underground
activities, which may have perverse effects.
27
w
EFig. 4
(b)
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 calculated over equilibrium values of E.
This condition holds only when the two curves intersect in the decreasing traits
of the zero-profits curve where 0<
∂
∂
E
wP (see fig. 4).
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The derivative of this expression with respect to E* is always positive if
α>
+
+
t
m
1
1
. In this case a larger number of firms will give rise to a greater
amount of aggregate output.
ii) The aggregate output can be rewritten as:
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If we rewrite equilibrium condition (eq. 14) as follows:
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it is easily recoverable that the expression on the RHS is increasing in E*. Then
by increasing E*, the expression on the LHS, which is positively related to
B(E*), must increase. But, if the parameter values do not change, this implies
an increase in B(E*). In the case of multiple equilibria, the parameters assume
equal values, therefore the equilibrium characterised by a greater number of
firms must have also a higher B(E*), and thus a higher aggregate output, as
well as a higher gi.
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Appendix 3
Rewriting equation (14) as:
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Stable equilibria require that 0<EF . Hence, for the implicit function theorem,
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, for x=z, m, η.  In particular, we have:
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In order to show that inequality (A4.1) is always true, while inequality s (A4.2-
3) are conditioned, let us again rewrite the equilibrium condition (eq. 14) as:
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Let us rewrite inequality (A4.2) thus:
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is ambiguous, but when 0→E the positive term is greater. Instead, for
+∞→E , the negative term prevails. From these proposition 4 follows.
Let us rewrite inequality (A4.3) thus:
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